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1. STATEIV[ENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by Berkshire Investments, Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, from a
Judgrnent dismissing the Appellants' complaint, and a fod2:,'111ent entered February 28, 2011 on
the trust's counter-claim. The dispute evolved from a real estate tr:.msaction between the
Theodore L Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller (refened to as tbe ''trust") and Berkshire
Investments, as buyer. The Appellants filed their complaint against the Respondents alleging
certain wrongful conduct including c1iminal conduct, fr:.mdulent misrepresentations, and to11ious
conduct relating to a p1ior consolidated case captioned Taylor v. Maile. The Appellants assert
multiple claims against the Respondents, to wit: (1) committing a fr::rnd upon the comi, (2) an
imposition of a constructive trust, (3) tortious interference with contrucL (4) tortious interference
of prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity, (5) committing acts that constitute almse
of process, (6) committing acts constituting negligence, (7) ,·iolating criminal statutes which
amount to Negligence Per Se, (8) committing acts constituting _gross negligence, (9) committing
acts amounting to equitabie estoppel, (10) committing ads mnounting lo quasi estoppel, (11)
committing acts in violations under Chapter 18 Title 78 of the J.C. (Racketeering), (12)
committing acts which constitute judicial cstoppel. The Respondents, The Theodore L. Johnson
Revocable Trust, Dalbn Taylor, und R. John Taylor filed their counter-clam alleging abuse of
process, slander of title, und tortious interference of prospective economic advantage.

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
A complaint was filed by the Appellants on December 31, 2007. An Amended
Complaint was filed on }\ifarch 25, 2008 (R. Vol 1. p. 000060). The Respondents filed their
Answers in May 2008. The Respondents filed their Motion to Dismiss/Motions for Summaiy
Jud6ri11ent. The parties filed pleadings in support and opposition to the motions. The trust & the
Taylor brothers filed their A.mended Answer and Counter-claim on February 17, 2009 (R. Vol 1.
p. 001019). Clark & Feeney, Connie Taylor & Paul T. Clark filed their Amended Answer and
Counter-claim on March 13, 2009 (R. Vol 1. p. 00 I 03 0). The AppeIIants filed their Motion for
Summary Jud,grnent and suppo1iing affidavits on March 17, 2009 (R. Vol l. p. 01042). Tl1e
Honorable Richard Greenwood, t:>'ranted the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing the AppeIIants' claims by an Order entered July 2, 2009 (R. Vol 1. p. 001363 ). The
District Court, reasoned that the claims of the Appe1Im1ts were baned by res judicata.
The counter-claims of Clark & Feeney, Connie Taylor and Paul T. Clark were dismissed
by stipulation on December 2, 20 l 0 (R. Vol 1. p. 001882). The counter-claims of The Theodore
L. Johnson Revocable Trust, Dall an Taylor, and R. J olm Taylor proceeded to jury trial resulting
in a judgment against the Appellants on February 4, 2011 (R. Vol 1. p. 002408). On March 7,
2011, the Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal (R. Vol 1. p. 002438).

Pursuant to post-trial motions ihe District Corni entered its Order on May 9, 2011,
denying the Appellants' Motion for JNOV (R. Vol 1. p. 002521). The District Court mvarded tl1e
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Respondents Clark & Feeney their costs and attorneys fees and further awarded the Respondent
trust its costs (R. Vol ]. p. 002524).
C. STATEl\IENT OF THJ·= TF'ACTS

This Court previously considered ceriain issues involving tbe Appellants and The
Thel1dore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and R. John Taylor, in tl1e
co11soliLfated case captioned, Taylor v. Maile. Addendum "A" is a comknsed recital of sworn
verified statements, po1iio11s of deposition testimony, declarations against interests of key facts
supporting the Appellants' claims.
Reed Taylor, DalLm Taylor, and R. John Taylor, as beneficiaries of the trust filed, their
complaint against tlie Appellants on January 23, 2004- ( T. E. 1l Op. 385). The Honorable Judge
Ronald Wilper, entered his Order dismissing tbe claims of the T:1ylors ruling tk1t as beneficiaries
the Taylors did not bave st an cling to pursue their claims cin their behalf or on behalf of the trust
(R. Vol 1. p. 000198 In. 19). On .Tune -1-, .2004-, the Taylor brothers filed their Notice of Appeal

regarding the Order dismissing tl1e beneficiaries compl:.Jint (R. Vol 1. p. 000211 ln. 9).
On April 14, 2004, Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Bart Harwood which establisbed that
lier clients, tbe Taylor brothers ,:voulcl disclaim their rights as beneficiaries oftbe trust in
excbange for the successor norninaJed trustees, Beth Roger's cooperation and sunender of her
trnstee status, ,vl1icl1 would allow tl1e Taylor brothers to gain control of the trust (R. Vol 1. p.
00056 I).

On July I 5, 2004, the T::iylors entered into a ''Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity

,,
.)

Agreement" with the nominated successor trustees and all other beneficiaries of the trust (R. Vol
1. p. 000611- annexed as Addendum B).
Tlie Taylors pursuant to the Disclaimer, assuming they \Vere the successor trustees of the
trust filed a new Complaint against the Appellants on July 19, 2004. (Case 33 781 R. Vol l. p.
00005). While the Taylor brothers' appeal was pending, the CUITcnt Appellants had claims
pending against the Taylor brothers and the trust in the two consolidated cases before the
Honorable Judge \Vilper (Case 33781 R. Vol [. p. 000053).
On October 20, 2004, the Appellants filed their Moti.:m to Dismiss Complaint and
Demand for Jury T1ial/Motion for Summary Jud 6ri11ent relating to the "trust's" complaint. One of
the issues raised by the Appellants in their Motion to Dismiss was the issue of the legitimacy of
the complaint filed by the "trust" since the alleged successor trustees, (the individual Taylors)
had not received the reguired Comi appointment making them successor trustees, pursuant to J.C.
68-101 & I.C. 68-107 (case 33 781 R. Vol 1. p. 00063).
The T::iylor Brothers initially denied any court appointment was necessary for their
appointment as suecessor trustees. After receiving the Motion to Dismiss, Cormie Taylor
representing her husband John Taylor filed a verified Petition for tbe Appointment of Trustees.
The petition was executed by R. John Taylor on November 12, 2004, as a verification of the facts
contained in foe petition. Page 2 oftbe verified petition stated under oath, "the petitioner's 88year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by viriue oftbe
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ten11S of a Disclaimer, Rel ease and Indemnity Agreement.'' (R. Vol 1. p. 00011 J). Prior to the
Disclaimer A 61-reernent, Helen Taylor was an income beneficimies for her lifetime. Any
distribution of income under the trust was discretionary with the trustees. Prior to the
Disclaimer Agreement Helen Taylor had no 1ight under the trust to receive any p011ion of the
trust c011rns (R. Vol 1. p. 000431 ln.9 thrn 25).
The Taylors obtained an ex-parte order from the probate eomi on November 17, 2004,
appointing them as successor trustees, retroactively to June 10, 2004 (R. Vol 1. p. 000067 In. 6).
On February 28, 2005, the Appellants filed appropriate pleadings before the probate comi
requesting that the ex-pa1ie Order dated November 17, 2004 be set aside. On Ap1il 18, 2005, the
probate court, entered its Order declming the ex-pmte Order entered on November 17, 2004 void
(R. Voll. p. 000068 ln. 3).
On May 2, 2005, the Honorable Judge Clu·istopher M. Beiter, entered an Order
appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor and Dallan J. Taylor as successor trustees of the
Theodore L. Johnson Revoeable Trust (R. Vol J. p. 000068). At that probate cowi hearing Jolm
Taylor testified "my mother is the benefieiary of ihe trust" (R. Vol 1. pp. 000348).
The Honorable Judge Wilper entered his Memorandum Decision and Order on 7/28/05
allowing the trust to amend its eomplaint after the Tc1ylor brothers received the required
appointment by the probate comi, and denying the Appellants' motion regarding that issue of
law. Judge Wilper did however, grant the Appellants' motion in pa1i ruling that the Taylor
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Brothers. now with standing as trustees, had waived rights to rescind tbe cL1ntract as "once a psrty
treats a contract as valid after the appemance of facts giving rise toil right ofrecision, the right of
recision is waived."O<'" Vol l. p. 000649 ln. IO).

T11e trust & the Taylor brothers moved for summary jud2:,'111ent regarding the Appellants'
counter-claim on May 13, 2005 (case 33781 R. Vol I. p. 84). On December 23, 2005, the
Supreme Comi, i'.;succl its Decision on the first appeal brought by the individual Taylors brothers
(case 33781 R. Vol IJ. p. 227). The Supreme Court in its December 2005 Decision, held in
Taylor v. Maile

L that beneficiaries such :is the Toylor brothers had standing to pmsue claims

based l!pon the all egatiClns contained in their complaint filed in fo.nuary 2004. In light of the
Decision, Judge Wi!per ordered additional briefing regarding pending motions for smnrnary
_judgment (case 33781 R. Vol JI. p. 241).
On January l J, 2006, Connie Taylor prepared and filed

c1

motion for lec1ve to file an

amended complaint with a proposed verified Amended Complaint. which R. John T.'.lylor
executed :is a verified pleading (T.E. 132 p. 478). The Amended Complaint & Dem:md for Jmy
Trial was filed on March 9, 2006, alletiring "all of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the
Theodore L. Johnson Trust" (case 33781 R. Vol II. p. 260).
Judge Wilper entered his Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, (,n
Februaiy 13, 2006, which granted in paii 2nd cknied in paii the trust & the Taylor brothers'
l'v1otion for Summary Judgment ruling that the Appellants were entitled to pursue portions of
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their counter-claim, to •.vit: to1iuolls interference with contn1ct claims, equitable estoppel, quasiestoppel, and their claim alleging a fraudulent transfer (R. Ve,] 1. pp. 000268, 273 ln. 10).

On February 13,2006, the individual Taylor brofoers, alleging they were beneficiaiies,
filed their J~v1otion fr>r Summary Judgment & Memorandum Brief (R. Vol I. pp. 000655, 000660).
On May 15, 2006, the district court entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims (case 33781 R. Vol II. p. 281 ). The district court entered the
''Jud1:,,r-me11t on Beneficiaries' Claims" on June 7, 2006 (R. Vol J. p. 0001 J 9). The Appellants
filed their Lis Penclens on May 18, 2006 (R. Vol 1. p. 001052. An appeal was filed on December
12, 2006. Judge Wilpcr denied the Tnylor Brothers' motion to remove the Vendee's Lien (R. Vol

L p. 001440).
During the appeal. the Appellants filed their independent action on December 31, 2007,
allcgir:g both equitable remedies and claims for drunagcs (R. Vol 1. p. 000017). The Appellants

filed their amended complaint and filed a Lis Pcndens on ?\if arch l 8, 20()8 (R. Vol 1. p. 001396).
On October 14, 2009 the Honorable Judge Wilper determined, tJ1e Appella11ts were
entitled to maintain a vendee's lien against the prope1iy to secure the return of the purchase price,
less costs which have been previously awarded by the Cami (R. Vol I. p. 001440).
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Was the District Corni conect in entering the Order dismissing the Appellants' Amended
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial?
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1

Was the District Court cmTect in denying the Appellants' Motion to Reconsider?
Was the District Court conect in denying the Appellants' affim1ative defense oflitig::ition
priYilege which v,ould have baned tbe counter-claims of tl1e Respondents?

4.

\Vas the District Court conect in denying the Appellants' claims to set aside ihe
"Judgment based upon Beneficiaries' Claims", based upon '·fraud upon the corni"' and/or
fraud upon the court by "officers of the court"?

5.

Was tl1e District C'ourt correct in dismissing the Appellants' claims based upon tl1e
fraudulent-criminal conduct of the Respondents in obtaining ·'Judgment based upon
Beneficiaries' Claims'"!

6.

Did the "fraud upon the court" committed by the "officers of the court" vitiate all
subsequent leg;al actions?

7.

'\¥as the JuclhJJ11ent entered on February 28, 2011 supported by substantial, and competent
evidence?

8.

Cm the filing of a complaint give rise to a finding of an abuse of process and toriious

interference with prospective business advantage?'
9.

Was the verdict finding an abuse of process and toriious interference with prospective
business advantage improper as respondents failed to provide any evidence contradicting
that the lis pendens were properly filed?

I 0.

Was the District Court conect in denying the Appellants' Motion for JNOV?
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l 1.

Was the District Court coJTect in a,.,varding costs and attorneys fees pursuant to l.C. §§ l 2-

123 to the Respondents and denying the Appellants' costs?
12.

Are the Appellants entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to rules 40 and
41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and I.C. §§ 12-121, 18-8701 et. Seq.?
H. ARGUMENT

1. SUMMARY JUDGJ\fENT WAS IMPROPER AS RES JlJDICATA DOES NOT APPLY
TO THE APPELLANTS' CLAJ"\'1S.

A. There was litigation misconduct committed by respondents that defeats the
application of .res judicata.
An analysis of the facts is required to determine the extent of the fraudulent-c1iminal
behavior perpetrated by the Respondents before Judge Wilper. The fundamental and essential
truth is that the Taylor Brothers and their counsel knew beyond certainty that the Taylor Brothers
were no longer beneficiaries of the trust when they filed their verified pleadings in January 2006
claiming they were residual beneficiaries of the trust. The reason they provided such
misrepresentations was to take advantage of the Idaho Supreme Court Decision rendered in
December 2005, holding beneficiaries had standing to sue. The Respondents committed pe1jury
and the subordination of pe1jury in obtaining the "Jud 6,ment on Beneficiaries' Claims". The case
of State v. Wolfrum, 145 Id. 44, J 75 P.Jd 206, (Ct. App. 2007), commencing at p. 210 of 175
P.3d R, provides:
The test for mate1iality is whether the testimony probably would or could
influence a tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon
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need not bear direct1y upon the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is materi::i1 if it
is materi::il to ::in y proper point of inquiry, and if it is calculated and intended to
bolster the witness's testimony on some nrnte1ial point or to support or :.itt::ick his
credibility. The dq,:rree of materiality is not imp011ant.... It is sufficient that it wos
material, and might have been used to offect such proceeding.
The Taylor brothers suffered tb e loss of their claims as beneficiaries by Judge Wilper' s
Order of dismissal in April 2004. In order for any claim to continue they bad to obtain control of
the trust from the nominated successor trustees, the Rogers, and file a new action on behalf of the
trust. Tbe Taylor Brotbers sold their bi1ihrights to obtrrin control of the trust.
Atler the execu1ion of the Disclaimer A 6:rreement, John Tciylor was clear and unequivocal
under oath wben he stated "my mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining brncficim:r oftlze

trust hr 1·irt11e of the Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". The ,uified pe1ition
executed on ?-fovember 12, 2004, requested the Probate CoUii to a]Jpoint tlie Taylor brothers as
trustees of the Theodore L Johnson Revocab1e Trust. The peti1ion prepmed by Connie Taylor
was executed by John Taylor as a verification of the facts. A verified pleading that sds fo1ih
evidcntiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying signatory is in substance an
affidavit, and is accorded tbe same prob::itive force as an affidavit. Ponderosa Puint Mfg., Inc. v.
Yack, 125 Id. 310, 870 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1994).
The Verified Petition was filed by the T<1ylor brothers as a result of Appellants' Motion to
Dismiss the trust's co,np1aint. 'TI1e motion alleged the Ta1fors had not obtained judicial
appointment as non-nominated successor trnstees. Tbe Verified Petition before Probate Couii
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obtained the result it was intended to achieve. The Probate Court on November 17, 2004,
appointed the Taylor brothers as successor trustees retroactive to the date of June 10, .2004. John
Taylor not only provided bis verified petition but he also provided clear and unequivocal
deposition testimony tI1at his mother was to receive any and all benefits of any fruits from the
litigation (R. Vol 1. p. 2008) (tr. 2/3/11 p. 377 ln. 2; tr. 2/4/11 p. 95 ln.19 thrn p.96 ln.CJ). A
judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attorney, in the course of judicial
proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of clisJJensing with the need for proof by the
opposing party of some facr. Sun Va11cy Potato Growers. Jnc. ,·. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Id.
761, 86 P.3cl 475 (2004).
John Taylor proviclccl such declarations on two occasions prior to the opinion in Taylor v.

Maile (1). Connie Taylor, acting for the benefit oftlie Taylors brothers in negotirrting the tem1s
of the Disclaimer Agreement.. prc1,·idecl dcclarmions tbat her clients would be willing to give up
tJ1eir rjghts as beneficiaries (R. Vol 1. p. 000561 ). Beth Rogers signed an affidavit rrs requested
in the letter from Connie Taylor (R. Vol 1. p. 00054 l ).
The Disclaimer l\~,·reernent, provides:"] .2

Disclaimer of All Other Intercsts .... 1.2.3:

Trrylor .... hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen
Taylor, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor.·' The Agreement recited the
Taylors claimed an oYvnership interest in the claim or cause of action by the trust. The Taylor
Brothers did not

SiJY

they considered themselves residual beneficiaries of that portion of the
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corpus relating to the c:mse of action. Nor did they say they were retaining an interest in :my
future corpm. The Taylor Brothers as beneficiuries did not have any ovvnership interest in the
cause of action initiated by the trust. The: trustee(s) ownc:d the chose in action. Trust property is
O\vned by the trnstee. Indian Springs LLC

Y.

Indian Springs Lmd Inv., LLC, 147 Id. 737, 215

P.3d 457 (2009). The beneficiaries of a trust do not have :rn ownership in the property.
The Taylor brothers were claiming an ownership interest in the litigation which they
intended to pursue as a new cause of action as successor trustees. The T:iylors wuntcd control of
tl1e new lawst1it because their prior suit initiated as bene.flciaries had hem dismissed.
Tbe judicial admissions clearly establish the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries. "ne
Taylors' mother bcc~1me the" the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the te1111S of
a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". The Taylors after the Decision in Taylor v.
Maile(]) found it convenient to attempt to undo tl1eir judicial admissions. The Respondents
knew the district court had ruled prior to tl1e Supreme Court Decision. that the trust did not have
the remedy zt\·ailable of having tbc real property restored. The district court stated, "once a party
treats a contnict as vaiid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right ofrcscission, the 1ight
of rescission is waived"' (R. Vol 1. p. 000649 ln. 10).
Not only were the Taylor brothers no longer beneficiaries of the trust in 2006, they did
not represent the interests of their mother. Helen Taylor was never a represented individual or an
interested party in any p::irt of the proceeding before Judge Wilper. The Taylor brothers
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circulated written contracts to all beneficiaries which required beneficiaries to contribute to the
cost oflitigation if they \Vere to be represented by the Taylor brothers. Helen Taylor ne1:~r
paiiicipated in the litigation which was brought by the Taylor brothers in J::muary 200-1-. "(R. Vol

I. pp. 000565, 56q, 570,571, 574, 575).
The Taylor brothers' fraudulent-ciirninal conduct directly influenced the district court in
entering the ·-Judgment on Beneficimies' Claims". TI1e Taylor brothers in tbeir motion for
summary judgment and their briefing were moving for summary jud61111ent solely in their capacity
as alleged "residual beneficiaries" (R. Voll. pp. 000655, 000660). On ~fay 15, 2006, the district
comi entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Juclh'rnent
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Beneficia1ies'

Claims (R. Vol J. p. 001355). The Order :111cl resul1ing Judgment on Beneficiaries' Cloirns l1ad
nothing to do witl1 Helen Taylor.
The primary object in interpreting a contrnct is to discO\ er the tntent of the pa11ies, which
should, ifpossible, be asce1iainecl from the language of tl1e document. Win of '.\1ichig:m, Jnc. v.
Yreka United, Inc., 13 7 Jd. 747, 750, 53 P.3cl 330, 333 (2002). The objective in inte11Jreting

:1

contract is to asce1iain and give effect to the intent of the parties. Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107
Jd. 693, 697. 692 P.2cl 337,341 (1984). Where a contrnct is determined to be ambiguous, tbe
interpretation of tl1e document is a question of fact which foc11ses upon the intent oftbe pa1iies.
Whether an arn biguity exists in a legal instrument is a question oflaw, over whicb an
appeJ!zite court exercises free review. Cool v. Mountaim·iew Landowners Coop. Ass'n, 139 Jd.
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770, 772, 86 P.3d 48-1-, 486 (2004). Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous the

leg'.11 effrct must be decided by t11e district court as a matter of 1mv: it is only when that
instrument is fr)llnd to be ambiguous that evidence as to the meaning of that instrume11t may be
submitted to the finder of fact. Knipe Land Co. v. Robetison, 37002 (IDSCCI 2011).
Appellants properly alleged criminal and frauduknt misconduct on the pmi of the
Respondents that removes res _judicuta as a bar to the Appellants' claims. Claims brought under
I.R.C.P. 60(b) are not bi:med by res judicatil because they are one of the recognized ''avenues ...
for attacking a judgment." Waller v. State, Dept. ofl-kalth and Welfare, I-46 Id. 234, 192 P.3d
I 058 (2008). Allegations relating to a '·fraud upon a corni'' and/or acts which amount to criminal

conduct and/or misrepresentations wmrnnt a good faith argument that a constructi,,e trust should
be imposed as well as relief of the jucl 61111ent based upon such criminal conduct.
\Vhether to gnmt relief under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)is committed to t11e
discretion of t11e trial couri and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of the court's discretion. W.
Cmty. Ins. Co. v. Kickers, Inc. 137 Id. 305, 306, 48 P.Jd 634, 635 (2002). Jn reviewing \Vhether
or not a corni abused its discretion this Cowi relies on a three-part test:
(1) whet11er the tiial cowi coJTectly perceived the issue as discretiom1ry; (2)
w11ether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent
with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial couii reached its
detennination through an exercise ofreason. Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Id. 640,
I 15 P.3d 731 (2005).

The lower cowi did not miiculate in its decision any appropriate b:1sis for the denial of
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equitable relief ( R. Vol I 001374). The facts are overwhelming. The Taylors and their attorneys
make a prirna facie case against tl1emselves solely on tl1eir own deposition testimony, verified
pleadings ::md other declarations against interest. The judicial admissions and declarations
against interest establish that there is a showing that the attorneys perforn1ed "some additionol act
in the use of the legal process that is not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings".
Perjury and/or subordination of perjury is an act not perfo1111ecl in the proper course of legitimate
representation of a client. See generally, Taylor v. McNicl1ols, 149 Td. 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010).
The Respondents were playing loose and fast with the judicial system which demonstrated a
tampering I hat is a wrong against tl1e judicial institution and tl1e public. Res judicata should have
no application to the matter.

B. Officers of the court committed a '~fi·aud upon the court" that warrants the
.Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims being set aside.
Connie Taylor and her husband, R. Jolm Taylor, were at all relevant times licensed Idaho
attorneys and as sucl1 were "officers of the court".
Vol 12 Moore's federal Practice§ 60-21(4)(6) provides:
One of the distinguishing facts in tlie leading Hazel-Atlas case was the
pmiicipation of a lawyer for one of the pariy's in the creation as well as the
presentation of the fraudulent evidence relied on by the Patent Office and the
Third Circuit. As a result, subsequent courts have stated that the participation of
an officer oftl1e cowi in the fraud is either an essential element of fraud on the
comi contributing to tlie subversion of the adjudication process or an alternative
basis for finding fraud on couri.
Tl1e Sixth Circuit has quoted, with approval, a definition of fraud on the cou1i Jhat
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consists of five c>kments: (]) conduct on the part oLm officer of the corni; (2) that
is directed to the "judicial machinery" itself; (3) that is intentionally false, wilfully
hlind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard of truth or falsity; (4) tlwt is a positive
avern1ent or is a concealment when one is under a duty to disclose; m1cl (5) that
deceives the corni. Thus, misconduct of an officer of the comi is an essential
dcment of fraud on the comi; but there is fraud on the comi only if this
misconduct precludes proper adjudication by the court.
The Ninth Circuit apparently treats misconduct by an officer of the corni as an
alternative basis for finding fraud on the court; an alternative to the definition
involving subversion of the adjudication process as discussed in [a], above. The
Ninth Circuit lrns quoted Moore's for the proposition that fraud on the court is a
"species of fraud vvbich does or attempt to, defile the court itself or is a frauc.l
perpetrated by officers of the comi".
The f omih Circuit has agreed.
"Altl1ougb perjury of a witness will not suffice, the "involvement of an attorney,
as nn officer of tl1e comi, in a scl1eme to suborn penury sl1ould ce1ini11ly be
considered fraud on the comi"
As has the Second Circuit and the Si\th Circuit:
"Since attorneys are officers of the cou1i, tlieir conduct, if dishonest, would
constitute fraud on the comi.
The record clearly establishes "'fraud upon the court" by officers of the cou1i. "Fraud 011
the court" is a claim that exists to protect the integrity oftl1ejudicial process, and tl1erefore a
cbim for fraud on the court cannot be tirne-b~nTed. See 12, Moore's Federal Pn1ctice §
60.21 [4][g] & 11. 52 (3d ed.2009) (citing Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 f.R.D. 625,634

(D.D.C.1969).
The affect of t11e :fraudulent-criminal conduct was gi·ave in the ultimate holding before
Judge \Vil_per. The prior litigation before Judge Wilper was consolidated ,vith the comi having
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two claims before it. One claim was on the beneficiaries' claims filed prior to the Disclaimer
Agreement. Tl1e other was the trust's claims filed after the Disclaimer A!:,'Teement. Judge Wilper
ruled tbe trust v,:ouid be limited to only a potential claim for money damages (R. Vol l. p.
000649 ln. l 0). Even after the Supreme Corni Decision in December '.W0S, Judge Wilper in
February 2006 had allowed the equitable claims of the Appellants to proceed to trial ;igainst the
trust (R. Vol I. pp. 000268, 273 In. l 0).
The effect of the fraudulent-c1iminal behavior prevented the Appellants from having their
clay in corni regarding their equitable claims against the trust for title and possession. After the
fraudulent-criminal behavior undertaken by the Taylor brothers led to the Judgment on the
Beneficiaries' Claims, the cowi did not allow such balancing of equities. Mr. Maile testified that
after the entry of the Order based upon tl1e Taylor brothers' motion for summary judgment,
attempts were made before Judge Wilper to proceed with the equitable claims between the trnst
and Berkshire Investments' right to title and possession. Judge Wilper denied such balancing of
competing equitable interests between the trust and the Appellants (Tr. 2/4/1 I pp. 42 ln. 7 thru 45
In. 24; 46 In. 16 thru p.4 7).
The lower corni was requested to take judicial notice of Judge Wilper's Memorandum
Decision and Order dated July 21, 2006 which provided, "The corni fincls that the effect of the
Comi's imposition of a constructive trust on the Linder Road property is the rcconvcyance of the
prope1iy to the trust and the quie1ing of the title in favor of the Trust". (R. Vol I. pp. 001354,
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001356 ln. 7). Mr. Maile testified that Judge Wilper, after the entry of the "Judgment on
Beneficjmies' C!Dims" refused to consider the equities between the trust and t11e Appellants, as
Hie judge concluded that the J udgrnent on Beneficiaiies' Claims created a constructive trust ,rnd
the equities be1\veen the trust and the Appellants were no longer Jt issue (Tr. 2/4/1 l p. 43 ln. 22
thru p. 47 !n.12).
The Appellants had fully pertcm11ed under the real estate contrZlct with the trust as of
January 4, 2004 (prior to the Tt1ylor Brothers' initial complZlint as beneficiaries), had paid the full
appraised value of the prope1iy, hZ!d received verificJtion from the p1ior successor trustees Beth
and Andy Rogers t!rnt the trust would be stm1ding by the trnnsZ1ction, and had expended
approximZltely $250,000.00 in development costs, largely after receiving such Zlssurances from
the no1ninated successor trustees (R. Veil 1. pp. 000281, 000499, 001139, 000649 ln. 4) (Tr.
2/4111 p. 3 l 1n. 24 thru p. 32). Where one pmiy to a void Jgreemcnt has fully perforn1ed, tl1e

corni will not require performance of the other party, even though a money judgment will effect
the result, but will leave the pmiies where it found them. McFZlll v. Arkoosh, 37 Id. 243, 246,
215 P. 978, (1923), Finlayson v. Waller, 64 Id. 618,134 P.2d 1069 (1943), Tew v. Manwming,

94 Id. 50, 480 P.2d 896 ( 1971 ), Ban-y v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Id. 827, 103 P.3d 440
(2004). Both the trust and the Appellants had fully perfom1ed under the void contrnct.
PZ11i performance can 6i\·e rise to estoppel Zlgainst the pa1iy seeking to void a transaction.
See generally Treasure Valley Gastroentero]ogy Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Id. 485, 20 P.3d
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21 (Ct. App. 2001). It is universally recognized that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to a

contr;ict fully perforn1ed by both sides. Frantz v. Parke, 111 Id. 1005, 729 P.2d l 068 (Ct. App.

1986), quoting WILLISTON § 528, at 72 7-28.
There

WJS

full perfom1ance by the Appel fonts which should have been considered against

any claim by the trust which sought to cancel the real estate transaction. The trust's nominated
successor trustees(s) Beth and Andy Rogers had endorsed and ap[Jrovcd the real estate
transaction which they knew that their uncle Ted wanted and Berkshire relied upon their
endorsement and approval of the transaction in making substantial improvements to the prope1iy.
The Taylor brothers and their attorneys' fraudulent-criminal behavior precluded a proper
adjudication by the court relating to the issues of estoppcl between the Appellants and trust.
Respondents Connie Taylor and Jolm Taylor's actions as "officers of the court" constitute
a "fraud upon the corni" that \VaJTants the equitable powers of the Cowi to set aside the
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims.

C The criminal(fi·audulent conduct Fitiates all subsequent procec'dings.
A "frnud upon the court" makes the orders :mcl judgments of that coUii null ::md void. /u1
ottempt to commit "fraud upon the corni" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State
of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354, 192 N.E. 229 ( 1934). Fraud vitiates any transuction
based thereon and wilJ destroy any asse1ied title to prope1ty no matter in wl1at fon11 the evidence
of such titlenny exist. Batterton v. Dough,s I\1ining Co., Ltd., 20 Id. 760, 120 P. 827 (1911).
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The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judt,'111ents as well
as to contracts and other transactions. A_Ilen F. Jvfoore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Jll. 316; 168
N

259 (1929), In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393 (1962).

A decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never
becomes final.

Frnud vitiates a judgment caused hy 1he active agency of some party to the

proceeding, as the court is misled and deceived as to the facts upon which it attempts to
administer the law, and the mistake is equally efficacious in procuring a wrong. Trim v. Trim, 33
So.3d 471 (Miss. 2010). Any subsequent orders or judgment entered after such fraudulentcriminal behavior should be declared nuJl and void.

D. The Judgn1ent on Beneficiaries' Claims should be set aside because AppeHants
acted reasonably in filing their fraud action.
There is no express time limit for filing an independent action seeking relief from a
judgment other than that the action must be brought within a reasonable time. Campbell v.
Kildew. 141 ld. 640, 1 I 5 P .3d 731 (2005 ). The detennination whether an independent action
was brought within a reasonJb!e time is ordinarily a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of
fact. Wallerv. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 146 Id. 234,192 P.3d ]058 (2008).
The Appellants cliseovery the fraudulent/criminal behavior while preparing their opening
brief in Taylor v. Maile 2. The Appellants raised the misrepresentations as a standing issue in an
attempt to defeat the Taylor brothers masquerading as beneficiaries. The Idaho Supreme Cowi
found the Taylors lrnd standing pursuant to the Disclaimer Agreement. Wben ~m issue of
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st::mding is n1ised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the party who is
seeking ihe relief. Miles v. Idal10 Power Co., l l 6 Id. 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989), Scom1
lnc. v. Green Vv'illow Trust, l 33 Id. 283, 286, 985 P.2d l 145. 1 l 48 (1999).
Tl1e Appellants' complaint requests that the jud;,rnent be sd cLside based upon tbe
Respondents' criminal-fraudulent actions and the title quieted in Berksl1ire investments LLC.
The lower cowi failed to detern1ine a reasom:ible time ( R. Voll 001374). Tl1ere was no
detem1i11atio11 of what constitutes a reasonable time. There is no express lime limit for filing m1
independent action seeking relief from a judgment. Res judicata does not ~1pply to the present
rniltter.
E. There were no damages until the '"Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims".

There can be no claim preclusion ifthere is not ripe for judicial cletem1ination a valid
cause of action. Idaho First Natl. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Id. 266, '.?.83-84, 8'.?.4 P.2d
841, 858-59 (1991 ). The time when a cause of action accrues may be a question oflaw or a
question of fact, depending upon whether any disputed issues of material fact exist. Where there
is no dispute over :my issue of rnateri al fact regarding \, hen the cause of action accrues, tl1e
question is one oflaw for detem1ination by the court. Reis v. Cox, l 04 Id. 434, 660 P.2d -46
(1982). The date for wl1en a cause of action accrues may be a question of fact or law. Jemmett

v. J\1cDonald, 136 ld. 277. 279. 32 P.3d 669,671 (2001).
The McNichols, case, supra, provides:
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we conclude that a cause of action against one party's opponent's attorney in
litig::ition, bc1sed on conduct the attorney committed in the course of that litigation,
may not be properly instituted prior to the resolution of tlrnt litigation, even where
the ::illegedly aggrieved paiiy believes that the attorney in question has been acting
outside the legitimate scope of representation and solely for his own benefit.. ..
Until the Underlying Case is resolved a court cannot deten11ine whether any
to1iious act was committed, let alone acts constituting the aiding and abetting of
those alleged tmiious acts.
Res judicata does not apply to the present matter when there are allegations of fraud
and/or criminal behavior in obtaining a jud,gment. There could be no cause of action ripe for
juclicial detern1inotion until the underlying case ,vas resolved and the Appellonts sustained
damages. The claims sl1ould not be cletennined baned as a matter of!aw. At the very least tl1e
accrual of the cause of action should be detenninecl to be a factual issue in dispute. Respondents
Clark & Feeney, Paul T. Clark, and Connie Taylor represented the interests of the Theodore L.
Johnson Revocable Trust, Dallct11 Taylor, R. John Taylor, together with Reed Taylor and acted in
conce1i with tl1e Co-Respondents.
The Appellants after the l\1cNichols, supra, decision, requested the lower court to
reconsider its earlier order b'Tanting Respondents' Summary Judgment and denying the
Appellants' Motion for Summary Judb1111ent. The lower cou1i denied the Motion to Reconsider to
allow the Appellants' claims to continue to trial (Tr 10/29/10 p.13 ln. 7). In addition tl1e lower
cou1i denied the Motion to Reconsider to bar Respondents' claims based upon litigation privilege
which the comi detennined did not apply to paiiy litigants (Tr 1l /30/l Op. l 9 In. 8 thru p. 20 ln.
11 ). The trial corni must consider new evidence that bears on the conectness of an interlocutory

order ifrequested to do so by a timely motion under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
· Procedure. PHH M01ig. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Id. 631, 200 P.3cl 1180 (2009). The
lmver corni should have applied the principles of the Iv'fcNichols, supra, case, by allmving the
Appellants' claims to proceed to trial and baning the Respondents' counter-claim.

F. There can be no application ofresjudicata based upon the lhigation misconduct by
the respondents.
The case of Robinson v. Robinson, 70 lei. 122,128,212 P.2d l 031, l 034 (I 949) holds
that res judic::1ta will not bar a claim when fraud is involved. Commencing at page l 28 of 70 Id.
Rcporis, the Jdaho Supreme Comi declared:
One of the oldest and most universally accepted juridical principles is that
embraced in the doctrine of res judicata. In the absence (~(fraud or collusion a
judgment is conclusive as between the paiiies and their p1ivies on all issues which
were (or should have been) litigated in the action ....
Generally speaking, the fraud which will invalidate a judf,'111ent must be extrinsic
or collateral to the issues tried, by which the agg1ieved paiiy has been prejudiced,
or prevented from having a fair trial. 1t is not sufficient to charge only intJinsic
fraud, or that which is involved in the issues t1ied, such as the presentation of
perjured testimony.
A pc11iy committing fraud will not be afforded the protection of res judicata. 111e
Appellants never had a trial before Judge Wilper. There was no presentation of testimony at
trial. The Respondents' committed pe1jury and subordination of pe1jury smTounding the
preparation and execution of the v~rified Amended Complaint filed January 13, 2006 and
committed false pretenses in the supporting pleadings that resulted in the Judgment on

Beneficiaries' Claims.
47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgme11ts § 537, Fraud or Collusion provides:
Fraud by a prniy will not undern1ine the conclusiveness of a judgment unless the
fraud was e~trinsic, that is, it deprived the opposing party of the opp01iunity to
appear and present his or her case. With respect to extrinsic fraud, the doctrine 0 f
res juclicata will not shield a blamewmihy defendant from the consequences of his
or her own misconduct. Accordingly, the principles of res judicata may not be
invoked to sustain frc1ud, and a jud 6'111ent obtained by fraud or collusion may nc,t
be used as J basis for the application of the doctiine ofres judicata.
The Appellants were deprived their clay in court solely based upon the fraudulent-criminal
behavior of the Respondents. As stated, in the Wolfrum, supra, tl1e statement is material if it
might have been used to affect the proceedings. 50 C.J.S. Judb'111ents § 532, provides:

§ 532. Fraud, collusion, or pe1jury

A judb'111ent obtuined by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances,
and subject to collateral attack, as where such fn:iud appears on the face of the
record or goes to the method of acquiring jurisdiction. Li!,ewise, thejudgme11t
may be attacked col!aterally where.fraud has hcen practiced in the 1·e1:v act r~f'
obtaining thejudgment, or 011 the party agaim·t whom thejudgment was
renderer!, so as to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his
case. Judgments obtained by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud may be attacked
collaterally. The extrinsic fraud which is required as a basis for collateral attacks
on judgments is defined as fraud which is collateral to the issues tried in tl1e case
where the judgment is rendered (emphasis added).
Judge Wilper prior to the material misrepresentations by the Respondents, precluded the
trust from rescinding the real estate transaction. The claims of tbe trust were limited to a cl aim
for monetary damages. The Taylor brothers assertion that they continued as beneficiaries of tl1e
trnst ZJftcr the Disclaimer Agreement ,vas a material misrepresentations v,.foch prevented the

Appellants from defending their purchase of the prope1iy bosecl upon the fair market vzt!ue of the
property :md pursuing their claim for damages. Mr. Maile testified that Judge \Vilper had
precluded any attempt to balm1ce equities between tl1e trust and the Appello.nts, reasoning that
Judgment on Beneficiories' Claims as a constructive trnst defeated any trial between the trust and
Berkshire. (Tr. 2/4/11 pp. 42 ln. 7 thru --1-5 ln. 2--+: --1-6 In. 16 thru p.47) (R. Vol I. pp. 001354,

001356 In. 7).
The pe1jury, the subordination of pe1jury, and obtaining money by false pretenses, is
estoblishecl in the record by the sworn testimony, and judicial admissions of the Respondents.
49 C..I.S. Judgments

~

310 provides:

.... In order for a paiiy to obtain relief under such a rule, the prniy seeking relief
must prove the most e_gregious conduct involving cmTuption of the judicial
process itself by establishing to the satisfaction of the trial judge that there was
pe1j ured testimony which inf1 uenced the judgment of the comi ....
In ~my event, some cowis hold that a j11dgrnent may be vacated for pcijury under
ce1t1in conditions, as where a party obtains a judgment by that pa1iy's own willful
perjury, or by the use of false testimony, which the pa1iy knmvs at the time to be
false.
The district cowi entered its ''Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims", solely upon the direct
material misrepresentations of the Taylor brothers and their ccrnnsel ofrecord. There is no
dispute that Connie Taylor prepared the petition and notarized her husband's signature on
November 14, 2004 as sbe did with the January 13, 2006 verified amended complaint.
A non-client may bring a cause of action against an attorney for abuse of process.
The o.bsolute privilege that protects attorneys from liability for defamation occurring in the

course of a judicial proceeding does not provide an attorney with an absolute defense to liability
for abuse of process. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 21 Attorneys. All Respondents had
actual knowledge of tlie true facts as to who was the beneficiary of the trust, consequently there
is responsibility for damages by all Respondents.

G. There has been no determination on the merits af the defendants' c:rhninal
activity or the fraudulent n1isrep:resentations.
Appellants raised the issue of the Taylors' standing in the prior ligation before the Idaho
Supreme Court. The contention is simple, the Taylors and their counsel of record committed
multiple criminal acts and committed fraud in representing the Taylor Brothers' st<ltus as
beneficia1ies which was the very foundation to the ultimate "Judgment on Beneficiaries'
Claims". \Vhen an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised,

but upon the paiiy \Yl10 is seeking tl1e relief. Miles, supra.
The Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issues of the criminal/-fraudulent
behavior of the Taylors and their counsel before Judge Wilper's Court nor the resulting damages
sustained by the Appellants. The Idaho Supreme Court did not lrnve to consider the same on the
merits, since the Supreme Corni detem1ined the Taylors had standing in case CV 2004-00473D
reserved by an "interest in the litigation" as set forth in the "Disclaimer, Release &
Indemnification Agreement" dated July 15, 2004. The material misrepresentations, and the
criminal behavior committed by the Respondents, and the damages sustained by the Appellants
have not been considered on the merits, nor could they have been. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion,
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144 Id. 119, 1'.22, 157 P.3d 613,616 (2007) provides:
There are five foctors required for collateral estoppel to bar re-litigation of an
issue decided in an earlier proceeding: (l) the pa1ty against whom the earlier
decision was asserted had a foll and fair oppmtunity to litigate the issue decided in
the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the
issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was
actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final jud 61111ent on the
merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the isslie is asserted
was a pmty or in privity with a party to the litigation.
There has been no detennination of the issues of fraud and c1irninal behavior of the
Respondents, and the resulting damages sustained by the Appellants. The Appellants had no
claim for relief until they sustained damages. There is no bar to the Appellants' cli:1ims based
upon res judicata or collateral estoppel.

H. D1fferent operative facts precludes res judkata & collateral estoppel.
The Appellants never had a cause of action against the Respondents until the ,vrongful
actions of the Respondents resulted in a loss of the prope1iy. The time of taking occurs, and
hence the cause of action c.1ccrnes, as of the time that the full extent of the Appellants' Joss of use
and enjoyment of the property becc.1me apparent. McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners
128 Id. 213,912 P.2d 100 (1996). There can be no applic3tion of the doctrine ofresjudicc.1ta, as
the Appelfants had no cause of action that stemmed from the sc.1rne operative facts which where
invo!ved in the 2002 real estc.1te transaction. See generally Sage Willow, Inc., v. Idaho Dept. of
Water Resources, I 38 Idaho 831, 835-36, 70 P.3d 669, 673- 74 (2003).
Res judicata nrny 3pply to claims tlrnt arose out of the same "transaction or series of
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transactions" as the previous litigation. U.S. Bank v. Kuenzli, 134 Id. 212, 999 P.2d 877 (2000)
The Appellants were cLmrnged solely by the wrongful conduct of the Respondents in J amwry

2006. The .'\ppellants' claims for relief are unrelated to the real estate transaction of 2002. The
operative facts involving the prior litigation, involved an alleged breach of fiduciary, allegedly
paying less than market Yalue and ,vhether a conf1ict of interest of a successor trustee required
notice to be given in 2002 to beneficiaries of the trust. The present action is based upon the
ivrongful conduct of the Respondents in the misuse of the judicial institution itselhvhicb
OCCUITed in 2006.

2. THE JURY VERDJiCT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, SUFFICIENT
AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND MOST BE STRICKEN.
A. As a matter of law the mere filing of a complaint cannot form. a basis for any
daims of abuse of process or intentional interference with a business advantage.
The trust and the Taylor brothers acknowledged the basis for their counter-claim was
predicated upon the filing of the pe1~jury complaint. As Connie Taylor admitted in trial in support
of an objection, we're here to decide the process for filing the complaint" (Tr.2/4/11 p. 68 In. 15).
The Appellants filed a motion in Iirninc seeking to preclude evidence of any 101iious action which
related to the reasonableness of filing of the perjury complaint (R. Vol l. p. 01917).

During the

trial, the corni oveJTuled an objection relating to the question posed to Jv1r. Lewis' "clo you have an
opinion as to whetber a reasonable attorney could have had any reasonable expectation of \Vinning
that case" (Tr. 2/2/11 p. 128 In. 23 thru p.129 ln. l 3 ). The lower corni allowed the witness to
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render his opinion.
The Comi in Bade]] v. Becks. II 5 Id. IOI, 104, 765 P.2d 126, 129 (I 988), dismissed an
abuse of process claim, noting: "Even assuming, arguendo, that a factual issue exists witl1 regard
to an ulterior, improper pm11ose, there is no evidence of subsequent misuse of process after it was
fawfully issued." Idaho courts have not extensively discussed the fact that the "improper'' clement
of tbe t01i of abuse of process requires a subsequent wrongful act, but the Cowi in Badr!!, supra,
cited the decision in Bickel v. _Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1978) for tl1is
proposition. In that case, the Cowi stated:
"Abuse of process, ... , is the intentional use of legal process for an improper
pm11ose incompatible with tl1e lawfol function of the process by one with an
ulterior motive in doing so, ... The improper use wl1ich is the essence of the to1i
is ordinarily an attempt to secure from another some collateral advantage not
properly includable in tJ1e process itself, and is, in Prosser's words, 'a forn1 of
extortion' in vvhich a lawfully used process is pervc1ied io an unlawful use."
Prosser states:
Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution in that the gist of the t01i is
not commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but
misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that
which it was designed to accomplish. Prosser, Law ofT01is, 4th Ed.§ 121 (1972)
Abuse of process requires an improper purpose which "usually takes the forn1 of
coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding
itself ... ".
As cou1is have declared in many other jrnisdictions, an abuse of process requires more
than the mere filing of a lawsuit. Seidner v. 1551 Greenfield Owners Assn. I 08 Cal. App.3d 895
at _p. 904 (I 980), Tellefsen v. Key System Transit Lines I 98 Cal. App. 2d 61 I, 6 I 5, I 7 Cal. Rptr.
9 I 9 (1961 ). Tellefsen, supra, I 98 Cal. App.2d at pp. 6 I 5~ 6 I 6, provides, some definite act or
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threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an object not legitimate in the use of the process,
is required before a party can sue for abuse of process. A process is not abused unless there is

J

definite act or threat beyond the scope of the process. As a result, the mere filing c,f a compbint,
regardless of the motive, camrnt serve as the basis for an abuse of process cause of ~1ction.
Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital, 217 Cal. App.3d 796, 826 ( 1990). The
oven:vhelrning majority of states hold that the mere filing of the complaint is insufficient to
establish the tort of abuse of process. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. T37, 752 (D. Ncv.1CJ85).
Jn tliis c::ise, there was no proof that subsequent to the filing of the pe1jury complaint and
lis pend ens associated with it, tliat there was any subsequent misuse of process by tbe Appelbnts.
Tlms, there was no b::isis in hnv or fact suppmiing the jury's verdict on the abuse of process
claim. There was no proof that Appellants did anything "independently wrongful" that supported
the jury's verdict on tlie intentional interference claim. As noted in Highland Ente11xises, Inc. v.
Barker, 133 Jcl. 330, 338, 986 p.:?.d 996, l 004 (1999), that tort requires proof that "(4) the
interference w::is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the
defendant interfered for :m improper pu1pose or improper means)."
There was a complete hick of evidence that the ]is pendens in either case were
independently wrongful. There can be no legiti1m1te claim of damages connected to any
wrongful act stemming from tlie filing of a ]is pend ens. No testimony ,vas proffered that the
filing of tbe ]is pend ens was frivolous or wrongful. The pe1jury complaint sought a quiet title
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action and a constructive trnst; both claims allow as a matter of law the filing of a !is pendens.
No one testified tlrnt the !is penclens before Judge Wilper was wrongful or improper, in
light of the fact that the trust continues to owe $400,00.00 to the ,:i,ppelfonts. The evidence
establisbecl a legitimate right to maintain the !is pend ens (Tr. 2/4/11 pp. 49 ln. 17 thru 51 ln. I).
The Appell::mts filed their Notice of Vendee·s Lien on August 3, 2009 (R. Vol 1. p. 001428).
On October 14, 2009, Judge Wilper specifically autborized a vendee's lien to be filed to protect
the return of the $400,000.00 (R. Vol 1. p. 001440). On November 5, 2009, the Appellants filed
tl1eir Motion for Foreclosure ofVendee·s Lien before Judge Wilper (R. Vol 1. p. 001445). The
foreclosure was stayed by Judge Wilper, pending the outcome of tbe present matter (R. Vol 1. p.
001614).
The Appellants were lawfully entitled to maintain a lis penclens on their vendee·s lien
foreclosure as any litigant would be entitled to record a !is pendens in any foreclosure
proceeding. A plain reading of l.C. § 45-1302 supports the Appellants' position that a lis
pendens is proper until the vendee's lien is foreclosed upon. The foreclosure ofvendee's lien as
with any lien foreclosure is addressed in I.C. § 45-1302, which provides:
Determination of All Rights upon Foreclosure Proceedings.
In any suit brought to foreclose a rno1igage or lien upon real property ...
the plaintiff. .. , claiming or appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or
interest in or to any part of the real or personal property involved therein, and the
comi shall, in addition to _granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the
title, estate or interest of all paiiies thereto in the same manner and to the same
extent and effect as in the action to quiet title.
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Judge Wilper entered his Order on March I, 2007 which authorized the Appellants' ]is
pcnclcns (R. Vol 1. p. /J0I408). The Appellants since the entry c,fthat Order, have had a lawful
right to foreclose a vendec's lien. A venclce's lien is afforded the same right as ~my other tyve of
lien foreclosure referenced in I.C'. § .:15-I 302 oncl is given the some effect as

~1

quiet title action.

Appellants ,vere entitled to record a lis pen cl ens on !heir claim for a return of the purchase price,
as provided in J.C. § -45-1301. The Respondents admitted that they had not returned the purcb'.1se
price, ond would not return the purchase p1ice unless the Appellants agreed to dismiss their
potential right to an appeal (R. Vol I. p. 001.:175).

In addition the Appellants properly filed a lis pendens in tbe lower court's proceeding
olleging a constructive trust, & Idaho racketeering violations. Any oction "affecting the title to
real prope1iy" clearly allows the filing of a !is pendens by an interested p::lli)' in urcler to protect
their interest in the property subject to the litigation. Such actions include suit:; attempting to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property to establish a constructive trust over real estate.
See generally, Bengoechca v. Bengoechea, I 06 Id. 188, 677 P .2d 501 (Ct. App. l 984), ,vhere a
claim for constructive trust relating to real property allegedly obtained by fraud allm:ved the filing
oflis pendens. A constructive trust czm be imposed where property was obtained either
fraudulently or through vic,lation of a fiduciary duty. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Id. 467, 409, 886

P ..2d 772, 774 ( 199-4 ), Witt v. Jones, 111 Jd. l 65, 722 P .2d 4 74 ( I 986). An action to impress a
constructive trnst on realty affects title to that property, so that a notice oflis pendens may be

filed. Ross v. Specialty Risk Consultants, Inc., 240 Wis.2d 23, 6.21 N.W.2d 669, 677 (Ct.
App ..2000).
The Idaho Racketeering Statute provides a remedy for the \Nrong:ful conduct of the
Respondents, which provides a comi may enter :.m order divesting the defendants of any interest,
direct or indirect, in the real properiy obtained in violation of I.C. Chnpter 18 Title 78, :md
specifically section 1 8- 7805( c)(d)( 1). A filing of a ]is pendens is appropriate in light of the
allegations set forih in the Appellants' Amended Complaint and DemLmd for Jury Trial.
Jn re:ility the Appellants i,,vere entitled to maintain the lis pendens throughout tl1ese
proceedings including the appeal as reasoned by Judge Wilper in the companion cc1se (R. Vol l.
p. 001408). The Appellants voluntarily released the ]is pendens in the present matter
irnmedi:itely after Judge Greenwood issued his Decision dismissing the Appellzmts' complaint
(R. Vol I. p. 001421).

There was no evidence presented by the Respondents to show that the lis penclens in
Judge Wilper's case remained of record for any improper time or prnvose. Nor was there any
evidence at trial that the ]is pendens filed in the cunent :iction was improper. The publication of
t11e notice of lis pend ens is not defamatory. Jt merely infonm the public that the prope1iy is
involved in litigation. V:inderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Id. 547, 165 P.3d 261 (2007).
The case of Dalley v. Dykema Gossett PLLC 287 Mich. App. 296, 788 N.W ..2d 679
(2010) involved a second lawsuit alleging the plaintiff and the attorneys in the first suit

improperly pursued their litigation. The Dalley cowi stated in dismissing the claims of abuse of
process and to1iious interference with a business relationship, Jt p. 324 of 287 Mich. App., "In
order to succeed under a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship, the plaintiffs
must allege that tbe interfcror did something illegal, unethical or frnudulent. There is nothing
illegal, unethical or frm1dulent in filing a lawsuit, whether groundless or not".
The issue of whether or not the actions complained of are or are not "wrongful" in this
context was for the cowi to dete1mine in defining the issues. The issue for the jury to dete1111ine
is whether or not the alleged to11feasor acted in the manner alleged. The decision in Carter v.
Carter, I 43 Id. 3 73, 146 p.3 d 639 (2006) established the right of a pariy to institute legal action to
protect their economic interests, even if it resulted in interference with an economic expectancy
of another.
An abuse of process claim requires proof that the t01ifeasor filed process not proper in the
course of the proceedings. The fact that the lower corni dismissed tl1e perjury complaint does not
alter tbe fact that the Notice of Lis Pendens was properly filed in conjunction with the complaint
seeking to quiet title to the rec1l property. There was no proof that the Appellants did anything
wrong beyond resorting to the legal process in an attempt to set aside an earlier jud 6'111ent and/or
advancing a complaint seeking damages. As a matter oflaw there was no proof that the actions of
the Appellants were independently wrongful. The jury verdict must be set aside as a matter of
law.

,., .1
.)

'

B. The LWgation Privilege is a defense to the Responde11ts' counter-c!aEm.
TJ1e AppeJiants' in a motion in Iimine requested the trial comi to limit tl1e Respondents'
counter-claim to facts that could be considered beyond tbe litigation priYilege (R. Vol 1. p.
001823 ). The District court reasoned that the litigation privilege applied to zittorneys but not to
Iitig.:mts appearing prose (Tr. 11/30/10 pp. 19 ln. 7 thru 20 In. 21 ).
The rnse ofWyru1 v. E.1rin, 163 Wa. 2d 361,181 P.3d 806 (Wash. 2008), namined the
application of the litigation privilege and held:
The California Supreme Corni explained the pmJ)Oses of the rule (which is
codified in that state):
The principJl purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford litigants and witnesses
the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed
subsequently by derivative t01i Jctions.
The rule promotes the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging "open
channels of communication and the presentation of evidence" in judicial
proceedings ...
Ultimately, the rule protects litigants, whose interests at stake in a cJse range
across the entire spectrum of prope1iy, family, and individual circumstances, by
encouraging the full, truthful, and complete testimony of witnesses.
The immunity afforded to statements nrnde during the course of a judicial proceeding
extends not only to the pmiies in

;:i

proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well. Cox

v. Klein, 546 So.2d 120 (Fla. I st DCA 1989). What the above holdings est1blish is that the courts
allow the privilege to attorneys advocating on hehu[f of clients, the litigcmts themselves, and
witnesses involved in pursuing corni proceedings.
The lower corni rejected Appellants' Motion in Lirnine reasoning that Mr. Maile and fv1rs.
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Maj]e \Vere litigants and the privj]ege applied to attorneys. The evidence presented by the
Respondents ancl their argument to the jury throughout the case was dinxted at Mr. Maile 's
actions as an attorney, representing Berkshire Investments. LLC and Colleen Maile. John Taylor
testified that he did not think that Colleen M;:iile did ::mything wrong (tr 2/2/11 p. 44 ln. 6). Over
the objection of tbe Appellants, Dr. Lewis offered his opinion reg;:irding the expected actions of a
reasonable "attorney," and offered no opinion regarding lhe expected actions of a reasonable
person. The McNichols, supra, holding is on point and applicable to the facts in this case
regarding the Appellants' litigation privilege and the lower court should have cleten11inecl that tbe
litigation privikge ~1pplied to the Appellants. The filing of the pc1jury complaint and the
recording of the lis pend ens were subject to a litiga6on privilege. Thcjury verdict should be set
aside.
The case of Weitz v. Green, ]48 Jdaho 851,230 P.3d 743, (2010) pro\·ides:
As the finding of slander of title in tl1is case wz1s premised upon a statement
made in the complaint, a necessary first step in litigation, where such statement
\Vas related to tbc underlying claim ag::iinst Respondents, that statement is deemed
immune. (emphasis added).
The Weitz, supra, case has importa11t implications in light of the law in the McNichols,
supra, case. The Respondents' contentions related to an a!leged improper filing of Lis Pcnclens
and the alleged misuse ofjudjcial process relating to allegations contained in the amended
complaint filed by Appellants. As the Weitz & McNicl1ol cases hold, such st:iternents \vhich are
set f01ih in a ]is pendens filed of record or contained in allegations of a complaint are immune

fr-om liability if they "had a reasonable relation to the cause of action of that proceeding".
Vvhether proteclcd under a venclee 's lien or a claim for a constructive trust, the pleadings and the
]is pend ens were reasomibly related to the claims for relief which were properly pursued in the
course of litigation in botl1 cases.
The common theme from other jmiscliclions is the determination of whether there is fraud
or criminal behavior in considering 1he exten1 of the litigation privilege. This is also seen in our
Supreme Comi's reasoning, in the McNichols, surpa, case and is important for the coUJi' s
analysis. The Respondents failed to allege any specific or general theories of fraud and/or
criminal behavior perpetmitec! by the Appellants. As stated in McNichols, supra, "Reed's failure
to make specific factual pleadings is paiiicularly fatal here. Jt appears most likely that Reed is
alleging that the goal of the conspin:icy was fraudulent, and civil conspiracy must therefore be pl eel
with pmiicularity under Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs, Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 990-92 (9th
Cir. 2006)".
The Jitigation privilege extends to litig:mts and attorneys. McNichols, supra, holds:
In fact, "at common law, the litigation privilege blanketed all pmiicipants in the
comi system; private attorneys were treated no differently tlrnn judges,
government lawyers, and witnesses .... This privilege is predicated on the long
established principle that the efficient pursuit of justice requires that attorneys and
litigants must be pe1111itted to speak and write freely in the course oflitigation
without the fear of rep1isal through a civil suit for defamation or libel.
The litigation privilege is presumed to exist. The dete1111ination of the privilege is a
question oflaw. The lower court in denying the motion indicated it would be addressee! by
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instructing the jury (tr l 1/30/l Op. 19 ln. l ). Such a detem1ination is a question of law not to be
decided by a jury. The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the comi, which an
appellate court reviev, s for coJTectness, giving no deference to the trial cou1i's cleten11inz1tion."
1

Staley v . .Tolles, 2010 UT 19, 20080492 (UTSC). If there is no dispute as to the operative facts,
the ::ipplicability of the litigation privilege is a question of law. Any doubt JOOlit whetl1er the
privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. Action Apartment Assn., Inc.,·. City of ~.:mta
Iv1onica, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 4] Cal.4th l :232, (2007).
The Respondents failed to allege any specific or general the01ies of forncl pcrpctu:1tecl hy
the Appellants. \Vithout such allegations in their Amended Coun1ercluim (R. Vol l. p. 001688)
and the Respondents' failure to provide ;:my proof at trial of any alleged crimin::il or fraudulent
behavi()r, the Appellants are entitled to tl1e absolute litigation privilege, as annunciated in the
McNichols, su1va. The Respondents failed to present evidence to limit the application of the
litigation privilege. Tl1e jury verdict should be set aside.
C. The district court erred in fai!ing to grnnt the JNOV.
In clete1mining whether a JNOV is proper, the court assumes without deciding that any

disputed facts are true, and considers wl1ether those facts suffice as ~1 matter of law to suppo1i the
verdict. Such a clete1111ination is reviewed by the ::ippell:ite cou1i under the s:irne standard as tbc
district comi. Karlson v. Hanis, 1--1-0 Jd. 56], 567, 97 P.3d 428,434 (2004). The corni reviews the
facts as if the moving paiiy had admitted c1ny adverse facts, clra\ving reascmc1ble inferences in favor
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of the non-moving party. Gillingham Const., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Const., Inc., 142 Id. 15, 20,

121 P.3d 946,051 (2005).
\Vhether tbe trial comi should have entered ajud 6'111ent notwithstanding the verdict is
purely a question of Jaw. Kulm v. Coldwell Banker, 150 Id. 240, 245 P.3cl 992 (2010). Based upon
the reasons set forth above, the lo\ver comi was in enor in not entering a JNOV.

3. THE COURT ERRED IN AVVARDING FEES AND COSTS TO THE RESPONDENTS.
A. There vvas no basis for an award of attorneys fees and costs to the Resporndents.
The district couii eIToneously mvarded attorneys fees to Respondent attorneys, pursuant to

J 2-123. It is provided in LC. § 12-123 that the court "may award attorney fees" on the condition
that the comi follow the procedure outlined in the statute. In reviewing an award of fees pursuant
to J.C.§§ L:?-121 or 12-123, the appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Webster
v. Hoopes, 126 Id. 96, 878 P.2d 795 (Id. App. 1994).
There is no dispute that tl1e Taylor brothers and their attorneys knew perfectly well that the
Taylor brothers had disclaimed their interest as beneficiaries in the trust as established by the
verified pleadings, deposition testimony and declarations against their interests. The attorneys had
written letters, prepared verified petitions, where the true facts were established. The attorneys sat
through depositions with their clients, who reiterated the position that their mother wc1s tlle sole
beneficiary and would be receiving the full benefits of any mvard from litigation. Their clients
never provided any coJTections to their deposition testimony in which they represented their
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clients (tr 2/3/1 I p.378 ln.9 thru 20).
The Respondents were playing fast and loose with the judicial process in p..::rpetrating their
criminal conduct. A fi·aud upon the court was ailegcd which wz1s well grounded in fact and law.
Mr. Lewis was not even aw:.ire tbat tl1c Appellants were seeking equitable relief (tr 2/2/J l p. J 87

ln.1 thru p. 18 8 ln.4 ). The entire course of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is
at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not he awarded even though the losing
party has asserted otJ1er factual or legal claims tlrnt are frivolous. unreasonable, or without
foundation. Coward v. Hadley, 246 P.Jd 391 (2010), Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Id. 22--1-, 235,220
P.3d 580, 591 (2009).
\Vhere

J

case involves a novel legal question, attorney fees should not be b'Tan tee! under

I.C. § 12-12]. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Id. 611, 6 I 4, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003 ).
However, a court may pursuant to I.C. § 12-123 may sanction frivolous conduct designed to
harass or maliciously injure another party in a civil case. Campbell v. Kil dew, 141 Idaho 640, 115
P.3d 731 (2005). LC.§ 12-l23(2)(b) allows courts to award re2sonable attorney fees lo a party in
a civil ziction that incuITccl the fees because of frivolous conduct. Conduct is frivolous if: (1) it
serves merely to harass or maliciously injure a party; or (2) if is not supported by fact or a good
faith argument in law. I.C. § 12-123(l)(b). Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County
Highway Dist., l--1-8 Id. 688, 227 P.3d 9--1-:2 (Idaho App. 2010). Tlie Appellants ad\·anced good
faith arguments in tiling tl1eir perjury complaint. The Appeilants are protected by the litigation
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privilege. An action is uot deemed to liave been brought frivolously simply b.::cause it ultimately
fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 Id. 687, 6S8, 778 P.2cl 809,810 (1989). In deciding whether an
award of attorney's fees is proper, "the sole question is whether the losing pmiy's position is so
plainly folLicious as to be deemed fiivolous, unreasonable or without foundation". Sun Vullcy
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Id. 87, 92, go3 P.2d 993, 998 (l 991 ).
The lower corni mvarded all attorneys fees requested by Clark & Feeney, even tliose fees
incurred after the filing of its counter-claim which was voluntarily dismissed. The case ofl'vfagic
Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 1 l 9 lei. 558, 808 P.2d

1303 (l 99]), provides that where there are multiple cfoims and multiple defenses, it is not
approp1iate to scgTegate those claims or defenses for the purpose of awarding attorney fees under

LC. §L?.-121. The claims and defenses were interwoven and fees should not have been awarded.
Respondent attorneys voluntary dismissed their counterclaim. The lower court mvarcled
fees and costs beyond the date of the entry of the dismissal of the pe1jury complaint. Much of
what was incurred after that date related to the preservation of Respondent attorneys' counterclaim which was voluntarily dismissed. Tl1e Respondents should not have been awzirded their
fees.

B. The Offer of Judgment defeated any :nvanl of fees and costs to the Respondents
and AppeJhmts should have been ~1warded their costs.
Respondent attorneys filed tl1eir Amended Answer and Counter-Claim on March 13, 2009
(R. Vol 1. p. 01030). Appellants served an Offer of Judgment on NovembtT 16, 2009 in the
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ammmt of $55,000.00 (R. Vol 1. p. 02346). During the lime pe1iod between the filing of the two
pleadings, Respondent attorneys claimed fees for $8,817.50 and costs for $2.5.50. A Judgment
obtained by the trust ·was $28,437.36. The combination of the Judgment ,md fees and costs
asse1ied for the time period prior to the filing of the Amended Answer and Counter-Claim is
S54,632..77 which was less than the amount offered in the Offer of Judgment ($55,000.00).
The Supplemental Affidavit provided that $34,854.50 was incurred for attorney's fees up
to the date of the filing of the Offer of Judgment on November 16, 2009 (R. Vol l. p. 02490).
The initial affidavit actually demonstrates that attorney's fee and costs from March 13, 2009, (date
their Amended Answer and Counter-Claim was filed), up to the date of the Offer of h!d1:,1111ent
were in the amount of $8,853.00 (R. Vol 1. p.02314). This is important for the corni's analysis
bec~mse Clark and Fecney's counterclciim involved the same issues which related to the defense to
the perjury complaint. Stewaii v. McKamin, 141 Idaho 930, 120 P.3d 748 (Id. App. 2.005). Clark

& Feeney had to advance the argument that the application of res judicata was blatantly apparent.
The expe1is who testified at trial disagreed upon that point. Where there are multiple claims and
multiple defenses, it is nof approp1iate fo segregate those claims or defenses for the prnvose of
awarding attorney foes.
There was a mixture of attorneys fees related to prosecuting the counter claim ancl defending
Appellants' claims, all of which involved issues of res jaclicata and collateral estoppel, conseqliently
the motion for costs and attorneys fees submitted by Respondents should have been denied. Tbe
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Appellm1ts should have been awarded their costs.
4. THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES A.ND COSTS ON
APPEAL.

Pursuant to 1.A.R. Rule 41, an award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate, when the
_prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees at the trial corni 1evel, pursuant to l.C. ~ 12- l 2 l, see
generally, Houston v. Whittier, 147 Id. 900,216 P.Jd 1272 (Idaho 2009). LC. § 18-7805 provides
the court with one of the appropriate standards for the determination of attorneys fees.
§ 18-7805. RACKETEERING - CIVIL REMEDIES

(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or properiy by a pattern of r.:ickettering
activity may file an action in the district comi for the recovery of three ( J) times the ~1ctual
damages proved and the cost of the s11it, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Id::tho Code, § 18-7805 & § l 2-12 l provide the basis to award attorney fees to tl1e
Appellants. The Appellants should be entitled to their attorneys fees and costs incuned berein.

rv.

CONCLUSION

The Appellants properly ::tdvanced legal claims against the Respondents for equitable relief
to set aside a judgment and a proper claim for damages. The application ofres judicata to the
facts alleged is misplaced. The dismissal of the AppelL:mts' claims inappropriately led to a jury
verdict against the Appellants and should be set aside. The Judgment entered against the
Appellants was rendered improperly as there were legitimate and well reasoned principles to
assert claims against the Respondents based upon tbeir criminal-fraudulent belrnvior in obtaining
tbe Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. Tl1e Respondents were not entitled to their costs and
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attorneys fees incurred. The Appellants are entitled to their costs and attorneys fees inctmed. The
matter should he remanded to allow the Appellants their day in court on their legitimate legal
claims of misconduct committed by the Respondents.
DATED this ;2.).. _day of July, 20 l l.
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TH C>M -~ S~V.,-~e--•T-.c-Ju-n-se_l_,-for
Appellants, Berkshire 1nvestments, Colleen
Maile.

CHRIST T.TRO~o-counsel, £
Appellant, Thomas G. Maile.

V.

CERTIFICATE OF M/'\JUNG
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this )-)- day of July, 201 l, I mailed two (2) true and
coffcct copies of the foregomg APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF. by placing the same in the

United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson
900 \Vashington St. Suite l 020

(X)

( )

U. S. Mail
facsimile Trnnsmission

Vancouver, Washington 98660
Mark Stephen Prnsynski
PO Box 829
Boise, fD 83 70 l

( )

U. S. Mail
facsimile Transmission

( )
( )

Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

(X)

CHRIST T. TROUP (S. co-counsel for Appellants.
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APPENDIX "A" TO APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
I.

Respondent Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Baii Harwood on April 14, 2004 which
stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficimies of the trust
unless Beth will affinn her prior factual statements in the fonn of an affidavit and agree
to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an agreement on
that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax
returns''. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Pmi One Exhibit "B" deposition of Beth Rogers
referencing deposition exhibit 39 -R. Vol 1. p. 000561).

II.

In response to the Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable Judge Wilper, the Taylors by
and their counsel ofrecord, Connie Taylor, filed their verified petition in the probate
court on November 12, 2004, requesting the probate comi to appoint them as trustees of
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition was executed by R. John Taylor
as a verification of the facts contained in the petition. Page 2 of the ve1ified petition
states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, }Jelen Taylor, is the sole
remaining bene.ficia,y of this trust by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and
Indemnity Agreement." (Exhibit "A" to the Verified Amended Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial- R. Vol 1. p. 00011 l)(emphasis added).

III.

Mr. R. John Taylor was sworn under oath and provided testimony before the Honorable
Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 and commencing at page 14, In 4, testified:
Q. Will you explain to the comi just b1iefly why it is that you want to serve?
A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought it was a
valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the beneficiary of the
trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim." During that same hearing
Mr. Clark provided in his closing argument before Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005
provided: page 17, In 12:
MR. CLARK: "Yes. Just b1iefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based upon, first, the
agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the Taylors should serve as
co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, have a guarantee in the
disclaimer. So they have some interest in the proceeding. Their mother stands to gain
and, thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding."
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One Exhibit "A" transcript of probate court May 2,
2005 hearing-R. Vol 1. pp. 000348, 000350).

IV.

The deposition of Reed Taylor provided the following testimony under oath:
Q. Through this lawsuit, if the jury ultimately finds in favor of the plaintiffs in this
matter, is your mother going to get anything? Do any of the proceeds from any Jude,rment
that's entered in this lawsuit - A. She will probably get it all.
Q. My question is: In that first lawsuit, although you are a named plaintiff, if that were
to -- if the Supreme Comi were to reverse the Summary Judgment that was entered, and
it goes to trial and you prevail, if I'm understanding what you've told me -- all right? -quote, your understanding is you don't get anything; everything goes to your mother?
A. My intent is -- I'm not going to say exactly how it's going to be disbursed. My intent
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would be for my mother.
Q. In the second lawsuit, the one with the Trust, who gets the money if you prevail?
A. Well, like I said, as far as, uh -- I haven't talked to, specifically, the ones that are out
of town. As far as John and I are concerned, uh, we're doing it for our mother, so ...
Q. So you and your brothers are not going to get anything?
A. We're not looking for money out of it, if that's where you're going
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Paii One Exhibit "C" pages 132, 133, 134, of the deposition
of Reed J. Taylor, taken on January 31, 2005 -R. Vol 1. pp. 000566, 000567).
V.

The deposition of Dall an Taylor provided the following testimony under oath:
Q. \Vhat was the purpose, then, of you executing the signature page on Exhibit 24 that
relate to the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement? Could you just explain to
me, in your own words, what Exhibit 25 accomplishes?
A. \Ve are the disclaimer of all interests. It is being signed by -- 1, dash, 2, dash, 1 by
Fishers, which disclaims all the interest in the Trust in favor of their mother, Helen (sic)
Fisher, so that they will distribute the money in the Tmst to Hazel Fisher. 1.2, dash, 2,
Seeley, is so the money, uh -- the children are released (inaudible) THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. "The children ai·e released" what? Speak up.
THE WITNESS: -- their interest in the Trust so that the money can be distributed to
Joyce Seeley. And Taylor, all children are disclaiming interest in favor of their mother,
Helen Taylor, so that she can get the remainder of her assets in the Trust.
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Pmi One Exhibit "F" pages 74, 75 of the deposition of
Dallan Taylor, taken on September 9, 2004 -R. Vol 1. p. 000582)

VI.

The deposition of John Taylor provided the following testimony under oath:
Q. Exhibit 26 of Beth Rogers' deposition, that's the Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial. That's signed by your brother and your wife; is that correct.
A. Yes.
Q. And did you have a chance to review that document?
A. I did.
Q. Before it was actually filed?
A. I did.
Q. Did you concur in the language of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial?
A. Yes.
Q. And what is it that the plaintiffs want out of this litigation; what is it they seek?
A. We want the difference in -- well, the difference in the value of the property and the
amount that it was sold for. And we believe that is S6 to $800,000.
Q. Okay. You've also sued for damages. Is that the damage claim that you're wanting?
A. Yes, essentially.
Q. Is that you want out of this lawsuit?
A. 6- to 800,000. Y cs.
Q. Anything else you want out ofthis litigation?
A. We would -- we would like to see that, uh -- uh, punitive damages are added to that.
Q. Okay.
A. And we would like to see, uh, you eventually disbarred.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Okay. Anything else?
No. That's enough.
Now, there is an allegation that you want a recision of the contract?
As an alternative. Yes.
But you want the money first?
It would be easier. It goes to my mom.

(Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed December 31, 2010, page 81 of the deposition ofR.
John Taylor, taken on December 14, 2004-R. Vol 1. p. 2008)( emphasis added).
VII.

The Idaho Supreme Comi issued its decision in Taylor v. Maile I on December 23, 2005.

VIII.

On March 9, 2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and
prepared by the co-defendant attorneys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended Complaint
states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho;
Dall an Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaint([{\' are residual
beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust." (The verified amended complaint is
annexed to Amended complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "ff'- R. Vol 1. p.
000186) (emphasis added).

IX.

The Taylors acting with and through their attorneys on February 13, 2006, filed their
Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' Claim. The first sentence of the
motion states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor (hereafter refen-ed to
as "the Beneficim:v Plaint(ff'i'') (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "L"- R.
Vol 1. p. 000655)(emphasis added).

X.

The Taylors again refe1Ting to themselves as Plaintiff Beneficiaries filed the Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Supp01i of Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim on
February 13, 2006. On page 5 of the Memorandum the Taylor Brothers state, "The
Plaintiff Beneficiaiies are entitled to summary judgment on their constructive trust claim
against the Defendants pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Comi decision dated December
23, 2005." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Paii Two Exhibit "M"- R. Vol 1. p. 000660).

XI.

The district cou1i entered the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim" on June 7, 2006 (The
J ud1:,JJ11ent is annexed to Verified Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as
Exhibit "C"- R. Vol 1. p. 000192) (emphasis added).
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3.
Release of Trustees - Estimated Exoenses. The undersigned hereby reie1se and
discharge Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers from a!l claims or causes of action, whether
known or unkno\v:1., he/she may have against them (i) in their capacity as trustees of rhe Trust, or
(ii) arising in any \Vay out of their service as trustees of the Trust. The undersigned further
acknowledge that the ,rustees have distributed, and he/she has received, a!/ of the property,
money and benefits to which he/she is entitied under the terms of ,he Trust, except an amount
which shall not exceed Five Thousand Doliars ($5,000), which has been retained for rhe sole
purpose of paying iccounting, legal and other expenses associated with the Trust. Any surplus in
such retainage will be distributed to the beneficiaries proportionateiy. The u1;dersigned
acknowledge the financial information he/she has received will constitute a final accounting; and
he/she waives any right to a court-approved formal final accounting.
4.
Resianation ofTrustees. The undersigned understand Andrew T. Roger:, and Beth
J. Rogers intend to resign as trustees of the Trust, leaving in the Trust t:i.e Claims described in
Secticn 1.1 above; and the undersigned approve of such resignation. The urdersigned further
understand and agree that the successor trustee, Ganh Fisher, will decline to serve as trustee, and
that Reed J. Taylor, Dalian J. Taylor a'1d R. John Taylor will be nominated and appoimed to
serve as successor co-trustees of the Trust.

5.

Indemnification. Taylors, jointly and severally, agree to defend, indemnify and
hold harmless (i) Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Roger~, and (ii) all of tJe other beneficiaries of
the Trust against all suits, claims, expenses, costs, attorney's fees, tosses or monies r.hat they may
incur or be required to pay as a result of any lawsuit by Taylors, or any of them, or their
successors, based upon the Claims, including, without J:mitation, any third-party claim or
counterclaim advanced by the defendants.
6.
Enumeration of Beneficiaries. This will certify the twenty-five (25) individuals
identified below as s:gnators constitute ail of the beneficiaries of the Trust. Exhibit A attached is
a graphical depiction of the relationship of the signators and grantor Theodore L. Johnson. Blair
Johnson predeceased the Grantor, Theodore Johnson, leaving no issue; and the beneficial interest
of Blair Johnson therefore lapsed.

7.
Bindine- Etfect. This ins!rument shall be effective as of :he latest signah1re by al!,
and not Jess than all, of the signators indicated below; and this instrument shall ::ie binding upon
the heirs and successc,rs of the pa11ies.

8.
Artomev's Fees. If any party commences legal proceedings for any relief against
the otber party(ies) arising out of this agreement, the prevailing party(ies) shall be emitb:: to an
award of his/her/their iegal costs and expenses, inducting, but not limited to, re2.sonable
attorney's fees as dcterrnined by the coun. The prevailing party(ies) sha;] be rhat part; receiving
substantia!ly ,he relief sought in the proceeding, whether brought to final judgrnerJ or not.
9.
Coun.teroarts and Facsimile. This instrument may be execu:ed in several
counterp1rts and a!l so executed sha!l constitute one instrument, binding on atl the parties hereto,
even though all the parties are not signatories to the original or the same counterpart. A signed
document transmitted by fax shall be ~he equivalent of execution and delivery of an ,)riginai
signed document.
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I 0.
Entire A:::creement. This agreement, together with all exhibits attached hereto and
other agreements and written materials and documents expressly referred to herein, constitutes
the entire agreeme:,t be:\\een the parries with respect to the matters set forth herein. All prie:r or
contemporaneous 1greements, understandings, representations, w:1rranties and statements, oral or
written, are s;.;perseded.

! l.
Further Assurances. The parties agree to perfonn such forther acts and to execute
and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably required in order to
carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention of the parties. Each of rhe signators
warrants and represer;ts th2.t in executing this instrument he/she is dealing wi~h his/her soie and
separate property.
12.
Gov::rning Law. This agreement shail be governed, crnstrued and e:iforced in
accordance wi:h the laws of the State of Idaho.
13.
Modification/Waiver. ~o modification, 'Naiver, amendment or discharge of this
instrument shall be valid unless the same is in writing ar.d signed by all parties.

HAZEL FISHER

Dated

GORDON E FISHER

Dated

GAR TH J. FISHER

Dated

JUDITH F CR.A \VFORD

Dated

JOYCE SEELY

Dated

DOROTHY S DAYTON

Dated

I D.-\ VID SEELY

Dated
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DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
1.

Di,ciaimers.

LI
Disc!aimer of Claims bv Certain Beneficiaries. Except for t~ose
individuals identified in tI1e last sentence cf this Section i. L each of the beneficiaries of the
Theodore L. Johnson Trust, UTD November 4, I 997 (hereafter referred to as the "Trust"),
hereby disciaims, in favor cf the Tn.:st, any ownership interest he/she may now or i:1 the future
have in any claims or causes of action by the Trust or the trustees of the Trust agains;: attorney
Ihomas G. Mai!e. or his successors or aff:Eates, including, without '.imitation, Thomas
Mai!e, IV, Co!!een ?vlaile, Ihomas Maile Real Estate Company and Berkshire Investments, LLC,
in connection with the purchase of real property from the Trust ("Claims"); and by this
Disclaimer, the same individuals confirm in the Trust complete ownership and control of any
such Claims. No warranty or representation is made as to the existence or efficacy of such
Claims, TI1e follmving beneficiaries do not join in this disclaimer: Helen Taylor, Reed l Taylor,
Dallan J. Taylor, M2rk J. Taylor, Gloria Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor.
l .2

Disciaimer of All Other Inrerests.

l.2.1 fi2her. Gordon E. Fisher, Garth J. Fisher and Judith F. Crawford,
comprising all of the children of H2zel Fisher, hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the
Trust, not previously disc!aimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor of their mother, Hazel Fisher, and
hereby approve immediate distribution to Hazel Fis.lier.
1.2.2 Seelv. J. David Seely, Karl J. Seely, Dorothy S. Dayton, Janet S.
Denison and Nathan L. Seely, comprising all of the children of Joyce Seely, hereby disclaim all
interests whatsoever in the Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section l.l above, in favor of
t;ieir mother, Joyce Seely, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Joyce Seely.

l .2.3 Tavlor. Reed l Taylor, DaHan J. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria
Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor, comprising all of the children of Helen Taylor,
hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trus~ in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, and
hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor. All of the individuals identified in this
Section 1.2.3 are sometimes hereafter .referred to as "Taylors".
2.
Receiot in Full - lncome Tax. The undersigned acknoVv ledge receip~ in full of all
property, money and benefits which he/she is ent:t!ed to receive from Andrew T. Rogers and
Beth J. Rozers, in their capacity as trustees of the Trust. This includes a full share of the final
payment received in 2004 from the sale to Thomas G. Maile/Berkshire Investments, LLC, in
2002, of the real estate located in Ada County. (Except for the Taylors, to the extent they are
retaining a beneficial interest in the Claims), the undersigned have no further expectation cf
receiving anything from the Trust. The undersigned further understand that the trustees have not
paid income tax on the final payment received in 2004 and that he/she will receive an IRS form
K-1 indicating his/her share of such tax, which 1s to be included on the beneficiary's own fedenl
and state income tax returns for 2004.
~

.,
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